

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**A WIDENING VALUES GAP BETWEEN THE
U.S. MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY:
ARE THE ALARMISTS RIGHT?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Some pundits warn that our military culture increasingly reflects a different set of values than those that prevail in American society. The military is predominantly conservative, while American society is predominantly liberal. The military is also more politically active than in the past. The All Volunteer Force, the drawdown, base closures, frequent deployments, etc., have increased the military's isolation from American society, perpetuating this trend and spawning an elitist mindset. A significant values gap between a large military and its society is unhealthy in a democracy. It is in our national interest to counteract this divergence. Any methodology that increases the flow of citizens through military service and back into American society in significant numbers would diminish over time the values gap between American society and its military. Several methods are examined. An option that appears both feasible and potentially effective is an expanded military service program that offers tiered enlistment options, to include large-scale short-term enlistments with incentives. Such a proposal would replicate the citizen-soldier dynamics in place during the peacetime draft, yet would rely on politically acceptable voluntary military service.

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Not long ago, the Army's then-Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs spoke out about what she perceived to be a chilling trend in America's military force: a culture and values rift between the professional American military and the society it serves. In singling out the Marines for excessive elitism, Mrs. Sara E. Lister cloaked her underlying message with vitriolic excess and triggered a public outrage that prompted her premature departure from office.¹ Somewhere in all the brou-ha-ha, her underlying message never received the public scrutiny it deserved. This paper will attempt to undertake that scrutiny and determine what potential implications flow from Mrs. Lister's message of concern.

A Historical Perspective on America's Relationship with its Military

This underlying message, that the US military is alienated from American society, is by no means a new concern. Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, identified a deep-seated and long-standing tension between America's professional military, with its inherently conservative philosophy, and an American society with a persistent history of liberal mindedness.² In truth, over the course of our first two hundred years, and particularly after the modern professional military evolved in the years following the Civil War, America's military has reflected American values only when the country expanded its small standing military to wage war.

Until the end of World War II, the tradition of the American military could "be described as that of a small, professional, cadre force in peacetime, and a citizen army

(in some form) during periods of war."³ The professional military of those earlier times was a society unto itself. While it certainly harbored elitism, as seen in the likes of General Custer, America's military was a small enough force that it posed no internal danger and isolated enough that its elitist bent seldom became a matter of concern to the public.⁴

Prior to the latter part of this century, our expanded wartime military was a mixture of conscripts and volunteers, mobilized from every corner of our country for a finite purpose. Upon achieving that purpose, these conscripts and volunteers returned to farm, shop or factory as veterans and got on with their lives. Throughout our nation's history, it would have been difficult to find an American family that did not have some tie to the military as each successive generation responded to a new peril. More significant, until Vietnam, those who answered the call to arms returned home as heroes, likely to reflect with pride and some nostalgia on their military experience and transmit that pride to the next generation.⁵

After World War II, America again sought to demobilize as quickly as her occupation force responsibilities would permit. Once the Korean conflict erupted and communist insurrections surfaced elsewhere, America faced the reality of a Cold War and began funding the largest peacetime force in her history.⁶ This decision brought with it significant new dynamics.

First, it necessitated retention of the draft for use in peacetime.⁷ As a result, America's standing army was no longer a small professional elite. It was quite large and manned with conscripts. For the first time in our peacetime history, young men

were being called to serve without a specific finite purpose save to deter communist aggression. While their service was largely involuntary, it was not generally unwilling. Americans truly believed they were better off dead than Red. Kid brothers fancied the idea of following in their World War II brothers', dads' or uncles' footsteps. Moreover, the GI Bill, although an off-again-on-again benefit, opened up otherwise unattainable career opportunities that were well worth a two-year Army hitch.

This large peacetime draftee army, aided by a residual glow from our triumph in World War II, had a significant impact on American society. Beetle Bailey and Sergeant Bilko became as much a part of our social fabric as Dennis the Menace and Dick Tracy. American values and mores infiltrated the military through the massive induction of draftees, and in turn military values impregnated American culture as these millions of draftees soon returned to civilian life.⁸ Not surprisingly, this process went largely unnoticed. In an age of saddle shoes and bobbie socks, Ozzie and Harriet, John Wayne and Joe DiMaggio, there was not a glaring difference between America's values and the values of her military. Almost to a person, Americans were staunchly patriotic, heady with the mantle of leading the free world against communism.

What brought us from that reality to today's reality where recruiters are not welcome in many schools while the Services struggle to achieve their accession goals,⁹ where generals and admirals are spoofed as imbeciles or portrayed as scoundrels in film, or where the Air Force is pilloried in the press for bringing Kelly Flinn to court-martial? The question can only be answered by reasoned conjecture, but it is a question worth answering if we hope to reform today's reality in any way.

Thomas Ricks offers up three areas of focus in studying this question: changes in society, changes in the military, and changes in the international security environment.⁹ These areas provide a useful outline for examining the issue. Of these areas, changes in society are probably the most profound and yet the most subjective to describe.

Changes in Society

These changes in society were likely underway by the time Kennedy came to office. Sputnik deflated the American bubble for sure. Kennedy promised to take us to the moon and asked us to make the world a better place through the Peace Corps, and we felt better for a while. Then Kennedy was killed.

Johnson stepped up to bat and America held its breath. Johnson promised a Great Society, championed civil rights, and gave us a tax cut. The economy boomed and America breathed a sigh of relief. Vietnam got serious and then ugly, and Johnson announced he was sending more of our boys over there to save those people from communism. People had a hard time relating to Vietnam, but they knew that communism was evil and agreed that we should fight it.


Then the induction notices started to increase, deferments tightened, the economy overheated and Johnson asked for a tax increase. Americans started to feel they were being lied to about the cost of the war and the level of our involvement. Our TV screens started to fill up with depressing footage of napalmed children, murdered POWs, talk about body counts, and Tet. Vietnam no longer looked like a noble cause.

At home, civil rights marches were overtaken by race riots, and Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy were felled by assassins.

Nixon won the election on a promise to end the war, but the war continued through another election while the anti-war sentiment grew. GIs returned home to jeering crowds instead of to heroes' welcomes. America was at war with itself. Then Watergate spilled onto the news wires while stagflation stunted the economy. America grew disillusioned. We chased our tails out of South Vietnam and, feeling guilty and humiliated, watched as Saigon was quickly overrun by North Vietnamese.

It was a time that crystallized our society's outlook into a lasting cynicism and disaffection. Figure 1 below reveals the result of that trauma on our attitude over time. Vietnam and Watergate are the scars of the Boomer generation. Our children do not know much about those events, but they seem to carry on the same cynical outlook. In fact, there has been a litany of more recent events to etch that mindset indelibly into our psyche -- Iran-Contra, Waco and Ruby Ridge, Whitewater, and campaign finance irregularities to name a few. That suspicion of government bleeds over to the instruments of government, and the military is no exception.

Figure 1: Trend in Trust in Government¹⁰



In tandem with this rise in cynicism and evolving from Roosevelt's New Deal agenda, American society has developed what many refer to as a "welfare state" mindset, in which "the receipt of benefits [has come] increasingly to be viewed as an entitlement . . . and not as dependent upon the fulfillment of citizenship obligations."¹¹ Government developed a robust social agenda out of necessity during the Great Depression and over time enshrined it to meet public expectation.

Johnson's Great Society agenda institutionalized this process in what Samuel Huntington refers to as a "Welfare Shift." Between Fiscal Years 1960 and 1974, he points out that, "across the board, the tendency was for massive increases in

governmental expenditures to provide cash for particular individuals and groups within society rather than in expenditures designed to serve national purpose vis-à-vis the external environment.”¹² Even today, twenty-five years and a “Reagan revolution” later, entitlements represent the predominant portion of the Federal budget and are projected to double discretionary expenditures in outlays by the year 2002.¹³

Concurrent with this shift to a welfare state, Americans have increasingly disengaged from such basic civic duties as voting. The percentage of eligible voters who cast ballots has declined steadily since the 1950s, at a rate of over two percentage points per election cycle.¹⁴ America is now close to the bottom of any international measure of voter participation in democratic governments.¹⁵ Moreover, according to survey data from The Pew Research Center, while 64 percent of Americans would be “very upset” if someone claimed benefits to which they were not entitled, only nine percent would be “very upset” with someone who got out of jury duty, 31 percent would be “very upset” with tax dodgers, and only 24 percent would be “very upset” with someone avoiding the military draft.¹⁶ In other words, Americans are benignly negligent about enforcing the responsibilities of citizenship but are zealous in safeguarding their citizenship entitlements.

Changes in the Military

If American society has grown jaded from the traumas of the latter twentieth century and more concerned with asking “what can my country do for me?” than “what can I do for my country?” -- what has been happening within the military during this

same timeframe? And how does that change, if such occurred, influence the linkage between the military and America at large?

The U.S. Armed Forces weathered significant changes during this timeframe, changes that profoundly influenced its relationship with the American public. In addition to preserving a peacetime draft for the first time in American history, the military desegregated under Truman. The United States did not confront racial segregation in a comprehensive way until well over a decade after integration was implemented in the Armed Forces.¹⁷ In fact, it could be argued that the infusion back into civilian life of military veterans who lived and worked in a desegregated Service world helped trigger or at least bolster the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

Increasingly, the military, primarily the Army and Air Force, was used to fight communism in Vietnam. How this war was fought and how it came to be viewed in America profoundly affected the military, both the leaders and those who did the fighting. Vietnam was the first major commitment of forces to prosecute a war that did not involve a mobilization or significant reserve call-up. Thanks to the peacetime draft, President Johnson had the leeway to bolster force strength through increased inductions rather than by turning to the Ready Reserve.

At first, the strategy was almost transparent to the American public. This was by design. President Johnson had costly Great Society programs moving through Congress, and it was important that they not be derailed by concerns over war costs. Moreover, Johnson guessed that America did not know enough about Vietnam to be that deeply committed to shedding American blood in such a remote area.

In a fairly short span of time, America went from a small advisory role to a full-blown fighting role. Soon it was not just some faceless American GIs going over there, it was everyone's son, brother, boyfriend or neighbor who went to Vietnam. And this war, for the first time, had daily television coverage. America was debriefed each evening by Walter Cronkite and the other network newscasters. Much of what we saw looked pretty ugly. More important, it seemed to us that America was forcing itself on the South Vietnamese.

Draftees, and to a lesser extent Regulars, lost sight of what they were fighting for. Many masked their dreadful reality in a drug-induced veil. Even so, they came home with a distaste for their military experience and, to make matters worse, they were heckled by anti-war protesters. What is more, the anti-war movement took on a distinctly anti-military flavor. The newer draftees brought this anti-military attitude with them to boot camp and from there to Camp Swampy.¹⁸ Morale within the Services hit rock-bottom. Ultimately, the Vietnam experience emotionally scarred both the returning draftee veterans and the professional military, spawning a mutual distrust between America and its military.

America's less than glorious exit from Vietnam afforded the military leadership an opportunity to examine its failings,¹⁹ prompted in part by such public critiques as Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage's *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, and Edward King's, *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem*.²⁰ Likewise the end of the conflict gave the American public both the freedom and the incentive to do away with

the draft.²¹ These two events precipitated the most significant changes to occur during this century in America's Armed Forces.

In an attempt to regroup, the military reaffirmed its basic values, values that had been lost in a sea of body counts, napalm, drugs, and children throwing grenades.²² Having inherited the racial strife imported into the service from American streets, the military faced the issue and worked its way to a better understanding, or at least to a better racial climate, through diversity training, affirmative action programs and strong command emphasis. Likewise, having brought rampant drug use back to its garrisons after the war, the military cracked down with health and welfare inspections and then with blanket urinalysis programs.²³

Concurrently, the Services implemented the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 with its own set of social transformations. The military competed in the job market and recruiting became a business, a big business. Pay scales became competitive, barracks became dorms, boot camp took a back seat to skill training, education opportunities expanded, benefits increased, recruits became applicants, and mess halls became dining facilities. After a bumpy start, AVF was off and running.

The AVF ushered in a new culture. The changes were not immediate in all cases; in retrospect, however, AVF profoundly influenced most of the major changes the American military has undergone during the past twenty-five years. Today's AVF military is mostly married, predominantly career-minded, increasingly populated with minorities and women, and contending with a growing minority of single-parent service members.²⁴ Daycare, schools, family practice healthcare, and family housing are now

as significant a set of issues on the plate of military commanders as readiness and training have always been.

In order to compete in a tight job market to attract recruits from a decreasing enlistment-eligible population, the American military has become a large and costly "social welfare" enterprise. Noted sociologist Morris Janowitz claims the military has "developed a highly effective 'welfare state,' with family medical, and social services unparalleled by most civilian communities."²⁵ Applicants enlist to partake in "what their country can do for them" to a greater degree than in the pre-AVF days of comparative austerity. "The most far-reaching consequence of the marketplace AVF is that it ultimately reduces recruiting an armed forces to a form of consumerism, even hedonism, which is hardly a basis for the kind of commitment required in a military organization."²⁶

These same AVF quality of life programs also mean that many, if not most, military families can live, shop, work, attend school, pray and recreate without ever leaving base or post.²⁷ Having been disconnected from their own communities, military families tend to keep unto themselves in order to feel some connectivity. In fact, the military installation makes a very purposeful effort to develop a total community. We reenlist families, after all, not just service members. Family support groups have become a *modus vivendi* in this age of deployment. Indeed, such support is crucial given the uprooted lifestyle and isolation from mainstream America that most military families experience. Yet its presence further cements the process of isolation of the military community from American civilian society.

Another outgrowth of the AVF is an increased reliance on retention to maintain strength levels. In the draft era, both the enlisted force and the officer corps were peopled by a significant number of citizen-soldiers who completed their two-year obligation and then returned to civilian life. A smaller proportion of the total force, the "lifers," stayed past their initial obligation to man the professional corps. First-termers were almost 80 percent of the force in 1969 and are barely 40 percent of the force now.²⁸ Today, then, retention is a more significant contributor to meeting end strength goals than is recruiting. In Fiscal Year 1996, for instance, the Department of Defense accessed approximately 180,000 new recruits while it reenlisted almost 185,000 first-term and mid-career uniformed personnel.²⁹ The result is a professionalized force, more removed from its roots in civilian society and less pollinated by new blood from that society.

Changes in the National Security Environment and Their Impact on the Military

With the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, the military has undergone a whole new set of changes that draw it ever further away from American society. First is its size. Since the late 1980s, force structure has been reduced by 33 percent.³⁰ A reduced force means a reduced presence. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs have been reduced both in number and in size, Congress has approved the closing of 97 major stateside installations in four previous base closure rounds³¹ and the Defense Department is now asking for two additional rounds. Likewise, Reserve centers and Guard armories are fewer and farther between.

Of the forces remaining, over 200,000 of them continue to be stationed overseas³² while an additional 45,000 or more rotate through shorter-term deployments on any given day.³³ U.S. military intervention overseas, ranging from humanitarian to peacekeeping to combat missions, has increased substantially since the bipolar stability of the Cold War era melted into today's litany of ethnic strife. This pattern of increasing deployment separates the military from America in a very literal, and in some cases also a political, sense.

The force reductions and increased deployment demands over the past ten years have raised considerably the operational tempo for those who serve. In order to accomplish more with less, the military has emphasized quality over quantity throughout the system. The military recruits primarily from the top mental categories; it allows almost 35 percent of first-termers to attrite prior to completing their initial obligation;³⁴ it has ratcheted down retention control points for the enlisted force and tightened selective continuation options for the officer corps as part of its up-or-out policy; and evaluation systems have grown more sophisticated in revealing relative performance levels to selection boards.

These and other policies ensure that only the best and most dedicated remain.³⁵ Regardless of what prompted someone to enlist at the beginning, and regardless of how important pay and quality of life issues are to reenlistment, anyone wearing the uniform knows when he or she decides to make it a career that it is a calling and not just a job. Those who are not dedicated and who do not value the military ethic generally fall out before completing their service obligation. Those who stay have

accepted such bywords as selfless service, duty, integrity, and moral courage -- words to which the military re-committed itself in the aftermath of Vietnam, while American society was losing sight of them. That the military community becomes both one's extended family and one's neighbor in the insular military lifestyle only intensifies one's commitment to the military's more conservative and self-righteous value culture.

Even while an epidemic of ethnic strife required America to commit many of its remaining forces to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations overseas, new missions have developed at home as well. America's military, both active and reserve, is increasingly engaged domestically in counter-drug activity and in disaster relief efforts.³⁶ As the military's domestic missions expand, the issue of *posse comitatus* has moved from back to front burner to become a topic for discussion in military circles. Tom Ricks points to some Marine Corps military literature that predicts future wars will "likely be on American soil" and calls for "major alterations" of restrictive U.S. laws in order to execute these domestic missions.³⁷

One could say that this increased domestic utilization might reduce the isolation of the military from civilian society. The more likely outcome, however, is that such domestic employment will reinforce the gap. The tendency to send in the military as the first option of choice rather than as a last resort only confirms the military's own sense of superiority, emphasizing the differences between a disciplined military and an unruly populace. It is one thing to have Guardsmen or citizen-soldiers, normally part of the community they protect, quelling civil unrest or enforcing curfews; it becomes another

matter, however, when an isolated, professional, perhaps elitist military is employed to police the streets.

So what?

What are the implications of this dissonance between the military culture and American society? One implication is a growing elitism. As Admiral Stanley Arthur warns, "Our inclination to hold our people to higher ethical standards creates a dilemma of having them believe that they do, in fact, embody a superior ethical and moral code which makes them better than those outside the gate."³⁸ To the extent that those in uniform consider themselves to be different from, even superior to, America at large, they will also begin to question the decisions of that society to make use of the military as an instrument of power. In fact, not so long ago Generals Colin Powell and Michael Dugan received significant notoriety for publicly advocating positions on military intervention relating to Bosnia and Iraq, prompting an equally public firing in Dugan's case.³⁹

Admiral Arthur points to several other notable incidents that support his concerns over a more pervasive elitism within the military rank and file and the resulting challenges to authority: "the recent troubles with hate groups and skinheads,"⁴⁰ "the medic who refused to serve under a United Nations command and the two Marines who declined to provide DNA samples."⁴¹ Tom Ricks seemed alarmed by examples of elitist thinking he discovered in various Marine Corps publications. For instance, the Corps' *General Military Subjects*, a textbook used to train all recruits at Parris Island,

begins by quoting Duncan [a retired Marine major and author of *Clint McQuade, USMC: The New Beginning*] on its inside cover. The job of a drill instructor, it quotes him as saying, is to undo '18 years of selfishness and me-ism."⁴² Duncan's book, Ricks claims, "is most interesting for what it states as matter of course -- essentially that American society is decaying, corrupted, misled by its elected officials, and deserving of resentment by the Marines who protect it."⁴³

Coinciding with this growing elitism is an increased political activism as well as an increased propensity toward conservatism and affiliation with the Republican party. Even World War II legends-turned-statesmen such as George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower followed the long-standing military tradition of withholding their political leanings and affiliation while they wore the uniform.

This is no longer the standard. In a study attempting to prove or disprove Tom Ricks' hypothesis that there is a widening gap between the U.S. military and U.S. society, Ole Holsti compared the political leanings of senior military officers (students at the National War College) to opinion leaders from *Who's Who in America* (as well as leaders from occupations underrepresented in *Who's Who* to make the sample more representative) over a twenty year period through 1996. His results "provide strong support for the propositions that members of the American military are becoming increasingly partisan, and that they are also significantly more Republican and conservative than civilians holding comparable leadership positions. Moreover, the evidence also sustains the proposition that the military-civilian gap in partisan and ideological identifications is widening."⁴⁴ In his own publications, Tom Ricks offers

additional support to this conclusion from less formal longitudinal studies undertaken on cadets and officers at Quantico and Annapolis.⁴⁵

As an indication of how serious some view this trend toward politicization, consider the rhetoric of Professor and former Chief of Air Force History Richard Kohn in criticizing Colin Powell for politicizing of the Chairman's role by questioning the wisdom to intervene in Bosnia and to allow homosexuals to serve in the military: "General Powell was 'in the face' of the two most powerful civilians in military affairs. The implications of this behavior were enormous. . . . Defiance at the top led to resistance all down the line, and, even more troubling, to the ridicule and contempt expressed openly about the President across the officer corps and throughout the military."⁴⁶

Colin Powell was not alone in showing political assertiveness. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William Crowe, endorsed Bill Clinton's presidential candidacy in 1992, and General John Shalikashvili while serving as Chairman criticized isolationist rhetoric that surfaced in the 1996 presidential primaries.⁴⁷ The more visible conservative political activism within the military has indeed become the subject for a growing array of books, studies, and symposia in both civilian and military forums.⁴⁸ In fact, a 1992 National War College student, Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Charles Dunlap, recently stirred a hornet's nest when he published an essay on a 21st century military coup taking place in the United States.⁴⁹

This politicization of the military is all the more problematic in light of the increasing numbers of political leaders in both the legislative and executive branches who have no military background to bring to the table as they endeavor to maintain

civilian control of the military. President Clinton is the first commander-in-chief since Herbert Hoover to come to office with no military background.⁵⁰ Clinton's manipulation of the system to avoid military service during Vietnam caused him much difficulty with both serving military and military veterans during the 1992 presidential elections. Likewise, of the four most recent Defense Secretaries, only Les Aspin had previous military service.⁵¹ As Table 2 below depicts, the decline of military experience in Congress is even more startling.

Table 1: Military Experience in Congress⁵²

Congress	Years		# House		% House		Senate
92nd	1971-72		316		72.60%		73
93rd	1973-74		317		72.90%		73
94th	1975-76		307		70.60%		73
95th	1977-78		313		72.00%		64
96th	1979-80		242		55.60%		58
97th	1981-82		269		61.80%		73
98th	1983-84		229		52.60%		78
99th	1985-86		215		49.40%		76
100th	1987-88		200		45.90%		70
101st	1989-90		203		46.60%		66
102nd	1991-92		196		42.50%		64
103rd	1993-94		185		42.50%		54
104th	1995-96		144		33.10%		49
105th	1997-98		107		24.60%		42

Professor Gregory Foster of the National Defense University asserts that these civilian leaders who lack military experience "have shown commensurately little faculty for critical discernment in military matters. Having further been consistently less than

adroit in the larger conduct of international affairs, they have failed to engender the minimal credibility necessary to compensate for their military illiteracy."⁵³ Given the 25 year absence of a peacetime draft, the end of a robust Cold War defense posture, the continued pressure of rising nondiscretionary entitlement spending on a balanced Federal budget, and the growing representation of women in executive and legislative leadership positions, 21st century civilian leaders with military experience will become increasingly rare in both the executive and legislative branches. In sum, civilian control of the military, an important aspect of civil-military relations, manifests serious flaws at both ends of the spectrum.

Nevertheless, we Americans are inclined to believe that civilian control over the military is both sacrosanct and inviolate within our American culture. However, Professor Orville Menard, in describing the dangers of an alienated army, warns that "civilian control of the military is not a natural state for a polity and may even be unnatural considering the experience of others. That such vulnerability exists today even within America is precisely the point that Colonel Dunlap makes in his essay. To counter this condition, Menard asserts, "In values, aspirations, and understanding the armed forces must remain a part of the whole society."⁵⁴ Today, however, we see serious disparities in all three areas -- values, aspirations and understanding -- according to the many voices sounding an alarm.

What Can Be Done?

Since there appears to be a growing consensus that military values are not synchronous with our society's values at present, the question, then, is how to restore some harmony? Given the AVF -- a smaller, more professional, more deployed force -- how can the American military remain integrated with its decidedly more liberal and self-focused societal base? Those who have studied this issue have, over time, surfaced a number of proposals, many of them only formative and often admittedly addressing only the periphery of the problem. They center around two basic options: either increasing exposure between the two cultures through educational opportunities, i.e., expanded civilian academic opportunities for military members and more robust training on civic responsibility and the military arm of government in civics courses; or, second, expanding participation in the military through some sort of compulsory or enhanced volunteer service.

Clearly, reliance on educational opportunities to bring greater congruence to the value systems of America and its military will never attain the critical mass necessary to bridge the gap. In a smaller military, there is insufficient flexibility in the manpower utilization arena to permit increased civilian educational opportunities that would expose a significant portion of military members to the more liberal thinking of academia. Within the public education system, many would claim the problems are more fundamental than those which could be addressed by an expanded civics curriculum. In fact, it is no accident that many states have instituted alternative teacher certification programs for military veterans, that organizations such as Cities in Schools have sprung

up with agendas that seek to strengthen the ties between the military and the classroom, or that the Federal government, particularly during the Bush Administration, has pushed the Adopt-a-School program within the Defense Department as part of its America 2000 initiative.

These initiatives have taken hold because the belief that our education system is broken is so widespread. Yet, even taken as a whole over the course of time, these initiatives will not diminish the values gap that exists and allegedly continues to grow between America and its military. However worthy such initiatives may be, at least some of those who seek to address this issue through educational measures recognize the limits of such efforts. Furthermore, their primary intent is to help youth, not to lessen any civil-military values gap.

Fears of the values-gap or of an "occupationalized" military has prompted a significant number of prominent political, academic and military leaders to propose some type of expanded military service, either of a compulsory nature, as an option within compulsory national service, as a universal military training option, or by offering tiered enlistment options. Champions of this collage of options include Sam Nunn, William F. Buckley, Charles Moskos, Andrew Goodpaster, and many other less recognizable names who have been associated at some time with the Department of Defense.⁵⁵

Despite the obvious obstacles that any of these variants to expanded military service would likely face, they do have in common a means to counteract a trend that contributes significantly to the values gap -- the increasing isolation of the military from

American society. Expanded military service of some form would reinfuse the military with the values of the "great unwashed" American youth; likewise, the quick return of new veterans to the streets of America in much larger numbers would reimpregnate America with the value code of its military. Given the potential of these options to diminish the values gap, they deserve further scrutiny.

One variant that received serious consideration off and on during the first half of the twentieth century is universal military training. It was promoted as a means of addressing the challenges of rapid mobilization, a difficult and time-consuming process that hampered our effectiveness in the early stages of our entry into the two world wars. Values gaps were not the primary issue back then, although military values were touted as a derivative benefit of the program. Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall were among those who supported this proposal. Once the peacetime draft was implemented, however, universal military training faded off the screen.⁵⁶

Two issues make universal military training an impractical means to address a widening values gap. First, whatever values shaping that might occur through universal military training would affect primarily those citizens who underwent the training. The professional military, largely insulated from the training base, would benefit little from any cross-pollination of societal values. The influence this program might have on anyone's values would be minimal since the training period would be relatively brief. The second issue that makes this option impractical is that, given the end of the Cold War era, few believe that full-scale mobilization is a real possibility. Hence, neither the

public will nor the security justification currently exists to implement universal military training, particularly in this fiscally constrained environment.

A second variant within the expanded military service category is national service, in which military service is one of several service options. Both compulsory and voluntary versions of this proposal have had their proponents. National service came to prominence for two separate but converging reasons: growing concerns over the sustainability of the AVF and even greater concerns over negative trends in youth crime, drug use, and civic mindedness.⁵⁷

Several national service bills were introduced during the 1980s; the Nunn-McCurdy Citizen and National Service Act of 1989 gained the most notoriety.⁵⁸ Congress ultimately enacted a less ambitious national service program, AmeriCorps*USA, in 1993.⁵⁹ AmeriCorps does not incorporate a military service option and is too small in scale to address adequately all the concerns that originally gave rise to the interest in national service legislation. Hence, there is still potential to build support for a more robust form of national service, even though sizable force reductions have since dampened pragmatic concerns over the sustainability of the AVF. But how effectively would such a proposal be in countering the civil-military values gap?

To examine this question, it is not necessary to differentiate between voluntary or compulsory national service proposals. Admittedly, the two options would have decidedly different ramifications in areas unrelated to the values gap, particularly in affecting how politically feasible the proposal would be. Those ramifications are irrelevant to the issue at hand, however. For our purposes, assume that those who opt

for the military as their service choice will serve either a two-year active duty obligation or an extended training period plus multi-year reserve duty obligation. The military option would by necessity entail additional benefits not offered to those selecting civil sector options. How pay and benefits within the national service option might compare to AVF pay and benefits would require thoughtful consideration, but this question is not likely to be an issue that would affect the success or failure of this option in addressing the civil-military values gap.

The key factor in examining this proposal from the viewpoint of addressing the values gap is the degree to which it cross-pollinates values in both civil and military directions. Since the program would necessarily increase the influx of newcomers into the military system under a two-year enlistment option, it would enhance the professional military's exposure to the "nearly civilian" sector. Likewise the program would cause a greater number of American youth to experience the military value system, and most of these young people would return to civilian life imbued with some lingering portion of that value system. Even those who chose a nonmilitary national service option would be likely to undergo a similar value shift through their community service experience. Thus, if a national service program were enacted on a grand scale, it would, in effect, duplicate the cross-pollination of values between American society and its military that took place during the Cold War draft era.

Nevertheless, despite an abiding interest on the part of many opinion leaders in promoting national service, the fact remains that a robust national service program failed to take root even at the height of public interest in the concept. It is less likely

therefore to take root now. Such a reality has led some to propose a third variant of expanded military service. Proposals in this group involve a tiered AVF enlistment program for military service unhinged from a national service concept.⁶⁰

In general, they envision a core recruiting effort that would offer longer initial enlistments with greater associated benefits or bonuses. Those who choose this option would be the pool from which the professional military would draw its career force. In addition to this standard tour option, recruiters could offer a shorter tour option that had a package of veteran and educational benefits sufficient to attract a larger percentage of youth from among those who are unwilling to make the full tour commitment. This segment of enlistees, with its more rapid turnover rate and the increased manpower requirements needed to offset the shorter enlistment period, would serve as the primary vehicle to cross-pollinate values between the civil and military cultures.

This set of proposals, if implemented on a large scale, would conceivably accomplish as effective a cross-fertilization of values as the national service variant discussed above. Furthermore, it would not entail the radical policy shift associated with implementing a national service program. Implementing the tiered enlistment program would, of course, involve significant expenditures. Depending upon how the proposal was crafted, however, these costs could be largely offset both in the near term and perhaps in the long run as well. For instance, funds for the short tour option could come from elimination of the student loan program option, thereby increasing one's incentive to take the short tour enlistment option to fund higher education.

Once these short-tour veterans returned to the civil sector, which they would do in relatively rapid fashion, they would be more employable, thanks to their military experience and the values they internalized from it, whether or not they pursued the higher education option. Thus, if the experiences of the initial post-World War II GI Bill recipients are any indication, in the long run, these new civilian sector veterans would be less likely to siphon off welfare or unemployment entitlements and more likely to contribute additional tax revenues to replenish the government coffers.

The tiered AVF enlistment option would require certain adjustments in the Defense Department system, the structure of the training base, assignment policies, and perhaps junior enlisted end strength to name a few. Some of this adjustment would no doubt be painful, even to a point that might make this proposal unpalatable. After all, the Defense Department did not embrace the national service proposals a decade ago, more than likely for these very reasons.

It is not within the scope of this paper to examine those implementation concerns in detail, however. Suffice it to say in response, the adjustments that would be required would be not unlike those that were in place to accommodate the large influx of two-year draftees in the years prior to the AVF. Moreover, it would reintroduce some of the more pragmatic benefits derived from the draft era, such as a significantly larger Individual Ready Reserve pool for rapid mobilization, as well as promote the intended benefit of narrowing the civil-military values gap.

In effect, the tiered enlistment proposal would establish a voluntary system to replicate the dynamics that took place during the draft era, in particular by expanding

the influx and exodus of citizen-soldiers to cross-pollinate more effectively civil and military value cultures. Since force levels are much smaller now than they were during the draft era, the proposal would necessitate some expansion of authorized end strength at the junior enlisted level in order to allow for expanded participation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the concerns that Mrs. Lister raised in a less than discreet fashion last Fall do appear to have merit. A number of trends lend support to the growing perception that our military culture increasingly reflects a different set of values than those that prevail in contemporary American society.

In particular, the military is predominantly conservative in orientation, especially concerning values in the social realm, while American society is significantly more liberal. The military is also more inclined to be politically active concerning those conservative values than its past traditions would indicate. Various events such as the AVF, the drawdown, base closures, and the military's relative success in dealing with such social issues as equal opportunity, integration of women, and drug abuse have increased the military's isolation from American society, perpetuating this divergence of values and permitting an elitist mindset to take root.

Given America's strong democratic heritage and fervent belief in civilian control of its military, this widening values gap is not just unhealthy, but dangerous. That America's global leadership position still requires it to maintain a large military even in the aftermath of the Cold War only adds to the danger of this values gap. It is,

therefore, in our national interest to find a means to counteract this divergence of values. If the experience of our pre-Vietnam draftee military is a reliable indication, any methodology that would increase the flow of citizens through military service and back into American society in significant numbers would diminish over time the divergence of values between American society and its military.

Several methods have been proposed to accomplish this cross-pollination. After examining several variants, the option that appears to be both feasible and potentially effective is an expanded military service program which offers tiered enlistment options that include large-scale, short-term enlistments with incentives sufficient to attract those who are reluctant to consider the alternative full-tour military commitment options. Such a proposal would replicate the citizen-soldier dynamics in place during the pre-AVF peacetime draft, yet would rely on a politically acceptable voluntary military service program.

(6,941 words)

ENDNOTES

¹ As first reported by Rowan Scarborough, "Top Army Woman: Marines 'Extremists' Women in Combat Backer," in *The Washington Times*, Thursday, Nov. 13, 1997. Sec A1. This article triggered immediate Congressional interest and a host of subsequent news reports and commentaries in several major newspapers and magazines, ultimately prompting Mrs. Lister's public apology and early resignation from office.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), see in particular chapters 3 6, and 9.

³ Mark J. Eitelberg and Martin Binkin, "Military Service in American Society," in *Toward a Consensus on Military Service: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service*, Andrew J Goodpaster and Lloyd H. Elliott, Co-Chairmen, and J. Allan Hovey, Jr., Rapporteur, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 241.

⁴ See, for instance, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; also *idem*, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in *Civil-Military Relations*, Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington in association with Gene A. Sherrill and Orville Menard (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), 8-9, which updates the original work.

⁵ Peter Karsten, *Soldiers and Society: The Effects of Military Service and War on American Life*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷ James L. Lacey, "Military Manpower: The American Experience and the Enduring Debate," in *Toward a Consensus*, Goodpaster *et al.*, 34.

⁸ Huntington, in *Civil-Military Relations*, 11; see also, Matthew Cullinan and Jennifer K. Eaves, *Forging a Military Youth Corps: A Military-Youth Partnership for High School Dropouts*, (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), viii.

⁹ Bruce R. Orvis, Narayan Sastry and Laurie L. McDonald, *Military Recruiting Outlook: Recent Trends in Enlistment Propensity and Conversion of Potential Enlistment Supply*, (Santa Monica: Arroyo Center National Defense Research Institute, 1996), 1.

¹⁰ Thomas E. Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society," *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations*, Working Paper No. 3, May 1996, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies), 5.

¹¹ See, for instance, The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, "Deconstructing Distrust: How Americans View Government," *Trust in Government: Summary and Selected Tables*; available from <<http://www.people-press.org/trustrpt.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 March 1998; and, Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States," in *Crisis in Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki,

contributors, (New York: New York University Press, 1975), which analyzes the decline from 1950s to mid-1970s.

¹² David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 86.

¹³ Huntington, "The United States," in *Crisis in Democracy*, 70.

¹⁴ Congressional Budget Office, *The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1998-2007*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1997), predicted that entitlements and mandatory programs (excluding interest payments) would be almost double the amount spent in discretionary programs in 1998, almost \$1 trillion compared with \$546 million, 34-36.

¹⁵ Thomas T. Mackie & Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991, 3d rev.), 456-501.

¹⁶ David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney (eds.), *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections*, (Washington: American Enterprises Institute Studies in Political and Social Processes, 1981), 216-262.

¹⁷ Pew, "Deconstructing Distrust," 21 in *Selected Tables*.

¹⁸ Lawrence J. Korb, "The Military and Social Change," *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations*, Working Paper No. 5, August 1996, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies), 4-12.

¹⁹ Huntington, "The Soldier," in *Civil-Military Relations*, 13.

²⁰ Sam C. Sarkesian, "An Empirical Reassessment of Military Professionalism," in *Military Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 8, August 1977, 3-20, provides a good review of studies from that timeframe.

²¹ Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); and Edward L. King, *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem*, (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972).

²² John G. Kester, "The Reasons to Draft," in *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, eds. William Bowman, Roger Little and G. Thomas Sicilia, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), 288-89.

²³ See for instance, John O. Marsh Jr., Secretary of the Army, "Values and the American Soldier" which introduced an issue focusing on values in *Military Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 11, November 1986, 4-9.

²⁴ Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, *The United States Army in Transition*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1973), Chapter 12, "The Social Responsibilities of the Army," provides a summary of initiatives underway at that time.

²⁵ Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Harry J. Thie, *Enlisted Personnel Management: A Historical Perspective*, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1996), 21.

²⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, rev. ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1971), xxxiii.

²⁷ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique," in *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade*, 17.

²⁸ Stanley R. Arthur, "The American Military: Some Thoughts on Who We Are and What We Are," in *Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future*, ed. Vincent Davis (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 20-21.

²⁹ Kirby and Thie, Fig. 4-7, 37.

³⁰ DoD, *Defense Almanac '97*, 20-22.

³¹ Comparison of facts from DoD, *Defense Almanac '87*, 26, and *Defense Almanac '97*, 17.

³² DoD, "Major Base Closure Summary;" available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/faq/pis/17.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 March 1998, 1-3.

³³ Arthur, 18.

³⁴ DoD, the 45,000 statistic reflects information on Army and Air Force deployments only; Navy and Marine Corps deployments tend to be viewed as a routine *modus operandi* within the sea services.

³⁵ General Accounting Office (GAO) Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, *Military Attrition: DoD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel*, (Washington: USGAO, January 1997).

³⁶ DoD, "Quality People: Lifeblood of a Quality Force - Prepared Statement of Fred Pang, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, to the Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 20, 1996," *Defense Issues*, Vol. 11, No. 27, <<http://defenselink.mil/pubs/di961127.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 March 1998, 4.

³⁷ DoD, "Services Praise Successes;" 1-12.

³⁸ Capt. Guy Miner, USMC; and William Lind, Maj. John Schmitt, USMC, and Col. Gary Wilson, USMC, as described in Ricks, "On American Soil," 22-23.

³⁹ Arthur, 18.

⁴⁰ As discussed in Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, No. 35, Spring 1994, 3-17.

⁴¹ Arthur, 18.

⁴² *Ibid*, 19.

⁴³ Ricks, "On American Soil . . .," 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁵ Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996," *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations*, Working Paper No. 13, October 1997, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies), 17.

⁴⁶ Ricks, 10-12.

⁴⁷ Kohn, "Out of Control, 13.

⁴⁸ David Evans, "Crowe Endorsement of Clinton Raises More Than Eyebrows," *The Chicago Tribune*, September 25, 1992, Sec. 1, 23; Bryan Bender, "Shalikashvili Blasts Isolationist Rhetoric of Primaries," *Defense Daily*, March 21, 1996, 434.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, Gregory D. Foster, "Failed Expectations: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations in America," *The Brookings Review*, Fall 1997, Vol. 15, No. 4, 42-45; Vincent Davis (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1996); also, collected working papers from the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Project on U.S. Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations.

⁵⁰ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," In *Essays on Strategy*, ed. Mary A. Sommerville, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993) 5-43.

⁵¹ Michael Nelson, ed., *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the Presidency*, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1989), 1299-1318.

⁵² Marquis Who's Who, *Who's Who in America: 1998*, (New Providence: Marquis Who's Who, 1997), 3370, for William Perry; and, Congressional Quarterly Staff Directory, Inc., *Biographical Directory of the American Congress: 1774-1996*, (Alexandria, VA: CQ Staff Directory, Inc., 1996), 594 for Les Aspin, 807 for Dick Cheney, and 841 for William Cohen.

⁵³ Stephen Krome Scroggs, *Army Relations with Congress: The Impact of Culture and Organization*, Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Duke University, 1996, 139; updated using *The U.S. Congress Handbook: 1998, 105th Congress, Second Session*, (McLean, VA: Barbara Pullen, 1998).

⁵⁴ Foster, 4.

⁵⁵ Orville D. Menard, "Remarks on 'Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations,'" in *Civil-Military Relations*, Goodpaster and Huntington, 80.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for the Country and Community*, (New York: The Free Press, 1988); Goodpaster, Elliott, and Hovey, *Toward a Consensus*; or William F. Buckley, Jr., *Gratitude*, (New York: Random House, 1990).

⁵⁷ Lacey, "Military Manpower," 27-36.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 44-48.

⁵⁹ U.S. Congress. Senate. *Citizenship and National Service Act of 1990*. S.3, 101st Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); see also, Phil Kuntz, "Nunn-McCurdy Plan Ignites National Service Debate," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 March 1989, 645-648.

⁶⁰ *National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993*, Public Law 103-82 [H.R.2010], September 21, 1993, *U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News*, Vol. 1, 107 STAT.785, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1994).

⁶¹ See, for instance, William K. Brehm, "Peacetime Voluntary Options," in *Toward a Consensus*, 152-199.

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